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Abstract
In this article we examine four objections to the genetic modification of human beings: the freedom
argument, the giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, and the uniqueness argument. We
then demonstrate that each of these arguments against genetic modification assumes a strong
version of genetic determinism. Since these strong deterministic assumptions are false, the
arguments against genetic modification, which assume and depend upon these assumptions, are
therefore unsound. Serious discussion of the morality of genetic modification, and the development
of sound science policy, should be driven by arguments that address the actual consequences of
genetic modification for individuals and society, not by ones propped up by false or misleading
biological assumptions.
Background
In Brave New World,[1] Aldous Huxley imagined a society
in which the government manufactures five different
human castes designed to perform different roles. Four
decades after the publication of that dystopia, Robert
Nozick[2] developed another futuristic scenario, the
genetic supermarket, to prompt discussion of the moral
implications of eugenics conducted not by the state, but at
the level of individuals. In the genetic supermarket, as
Nozick portrays it, becoming a parent is like buying a new
car. If you want to have a child that will be male, athletic,
musically gifted, heterosexual, 6'1" tall, with brown hair,
blue eyes, and an IQ of 140, then you simply purchase the
goods and services necessary to create that exact child. Par-
ents can design children to fulfill their own desires, hopes,
and aspirations. Since the 1970s, numerous authors have
examined the moral implications of "designer babies,"
and popular films, such as Blade Runner, GATACCA, and
X-Men, have also explored the subject. And fully five dif-
ferent presidential committees have dealt with ethical
issues raised by the genetic modification of human beings
[3-7].
As a libertarian, Nozick defended a laissez-faire approach
to genetic modification, arguing that the government
should not interfere with the market forces that influence
procreation. Other writers have put forth similarly vigor-
ous defenses of reproductive freedom [8,9]. Many com-
mentators, however, have argued for government
regulation of genetic modification in order to protect
important values, such as social justice and the welfare of
unborn children [10-12]. Finally, some have argued that
genetic modification should be banned, since any attempt
to modify the human genome violates human freedom
and dignity, and leads us down a perilous path toward
social, political and biological disaster [13-18].
Since the risks to unborn children from genetic engineer-
ing mistakes are not currently known, and are likely sub-
stantial, few authors support the no-regulation view with
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regard to modifying the human genome. Most of the cur-
rent debate is between those who think that genetic mod-
ification should proceed under some type of regulatory
scheme, and those who think that the best solution is to
ban genetic modification entirely [19]. Those who favor
regulation see nothing inherently wrong with genetic
modification: the morality of genetic modification
depends on an adequate understanding and evaluation of
the medical, social, economic, political, and biological
consequences. Society should take appropriate steps to
control genetic modification in order to maximize its ben-
efits and minimize its harms [11,12]. Those who favor a
ban, however, believe there is something inherently
wrong with genetic modification, that there are inevitable,
unavoidable, and undesirable consequences associated
with modifying the human genome [16].
In this article, we examine four arguments used to support
the view that there is something inherently wrong with
genetic modification. These arguments aim to pre-empt
analysis of actual or expected medical, social, economic,
political, and biological consequences, and to argue for a
comprehensive ban of the technology due to its very
nature. We demonstrate that these arguments against
genetic modification – the freedom argument, the gifted-
ness argument, the authenticity argument, and the
uniqueness argument – all necessarily assume a strong
version of genetic determinism. If these deterministic
assumptions are false, as we maintain they clearly are,
then these particular arguments against genetic modifica-
tion lose their logical force. Thus, serious discussion of the
morality of genetic modification is more properly focused
on arguments that examine and address the expected con-
sequences of genetic modification for individuals and
society, and not on ones that would pre-empt such a dis-
cussion by arguing that genetic modification is inherently
objectionable.
Our analysis is divided into three separate parts. First, we
attempt to define two important terms: "genetic modifica-
tion" and "genetic determinism." Second, after explaining
the difference between the stronger and weaker forms of
genetic determinism, and examining why the stronger ver-
sions of genetic determinism appear very rarely in biol-
ogy, we unpack four common arguments against the use
of genetic modification and show how they lean heavily
on assumptions of strong genetic determinism. Finally,
we argue that moral assessments of genetic modification
should consider arguments that pragmatically examine
the biological, medical, social, and economic conse-
quences of genetic modification, rather than those that
rely on scientifically unwarranted assumptions of genetic
determinism to portray genetic modification as inherently
objectionable.
What is genetic modification?
"Genetic modification" has many apparent synonyms in
the literature: genetic engineering, genetic enhancement,
germline engineering, germline enhancement, germline
therapy, germline manipulation, genome manipulation,
and so forth. In this paper, when we speak of "genetic
modification" we mean the process of intentionally alter-
ing human genes for the purpose of producing offspring
with those genetic changes [20]. We use the term "genetic
modification" because it covers a wider range of cases
than other terms, and because it does not assume a dis-
tinction between genetic therapy and genetic enhance-
ment, one which is difficult to maintain and which may
not be as morally significant as is often assumed [20,21].
Some examples of genetic modification include:
• Insertion, deletion or transposition of genes or DNA
sequences in human gametes, human zygotes or early
embryos;
• Transfer of ooplasm or nuclei in human zygotes;
• Introduction of artificial chromosomes in human gam-
etes or zygotes.
Some examples of procedures that we do not consider to
be genetic modification include:
• Insertion or deletion of genes or DNA sequences in
human somatic tissues;
• Insertion, deletion, or transposition of genes or DNA
sequences in human gametes, zygotes, or embryos for
research purposes, with no intention of creating human
offspring;
• Transfer of ooplasm or nuclei for research purposes only
in human zygotes;
• Introduction of artificial chromosomes in human gam-
etes or zygotes for research purposes only;
• Pre-implantation diagnosis and embryo selection;
• Prenatal testing and selective abortion.
The sine qua non of genetic modification is permanent
genetic alteration: the intentional production of human
offspring with artificially induced genetic changes, or
"designer babies."
What is genetic determinism?
"Genetic determinism" is another term that needs clarifi-
cation. In philosophy, determinism is usually equated
with the problem of free will: We are compelled to makePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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the choices that we make as a result of previous circum-
stances, and we cannot make choices that are genuinely
free. This type of determinism, which we shall call psycho-
logical determinism, has some profound implications for
morality and the law, since we normally ascribe moral or
legal responsibility to people under the assumption that
they can choose freely. Over the years, philosophers have
developed three basic positions on the problem of free
will: 1) hard determinism, which holds that we cannot
make free choices; 2) indeterminism, which holds that
human actions result from spontaneous acts of the will
that break free from the world's causal nexus, and 3) com-
patiblism, which holds that free will is compatible with
determinism [22]. According to some compatibilists,
actions may be considered "free" if they are caused in the
appropriate way. For example, a "free" act is one that
results from reasoning and deliberation rather than exter-
nal forces or emotional compulsions [22].
While questions about the metaphysics of human free-
dom are of the utmost importance in philosophy, they are
not the focus of this article. However, there are some
important parallels between psychological determinism
and genetic determinism, since the interpretation of cau-
sation plays a pivotal role in both of these doctrines. Also,
as we shall see below, worries about genetic determinism
can reinforce concerns about psychological determinism
[23]. Since the concept of causation plays a central role in
various forms of determinism in philosophy and science,
we will say a bit more about causation. We do not have
space in this paper to provide a detailed analysis of causa-
tion, but we will make a few critical points that are rele-
vant to questions about genetic determinism (for further
discussion of causation, see Salmon, 1997; Tooley, 2000)
[24,25].
First, causation is a temporally ordered relationship
between events, properties, or processes. In the statement,
"lightning caused the forest fire," lightning precedes the
forest fire. Second, almost all causal relationships involve
more than one factor (or condition). For example, the dry-
ness of the forest and wind velocity would also be causal
factors in the forest fire. Very often, causal factors serve as
background assumptions in causal explanations [25]. For
example, a person who claims that lightning caused the
forest fire would be assuming that there was enough oxy-
gen in the atmosphere to fuel the fire. Third, causal state-
ments can be used in explanation or prediction [24]. For
example, the statement "smoking causes lung cancer" can
be used to predict that a person who is a heavy smoker
will develop cancer, or to explain why a heavy smoker
develops cancer.
Fourth, and of greatest import for our purposes, causal
relationships can be either deterministic or probabilistic
[24]. For example, consider the claim "If you drop a rock,
it will fall". Many would consider this to be a determinis-
tic form of causation because it does not make a reference
to the probability, or chance, of an event occurring: the
rock will fall if it is dropped (assuming background condi-
tions, e.g. there is not a strong wind pushing the rock up).
However, consider research on smoking and lung cancer.
Smoking causes lung cancer, even though many smokers
do not develop lung cancer [26]. If you smoke, you may
not get lung cancer, but smoking increases your probabil-
ity of getting lung cancer. While deterministic causation is
common in the physical sciences, it is very rare in biology
and in medicine. Most explanations and predictions in
the biomedical sciences are probabilistic, not determinis-
tic [27]. As we shall soon see, despite assumptions to the
contrary, most of the causal claims related to genetic
determinism are probabilistic, not deterministic.
With the preceding comments in mind, we now consider
genetic determinism. Genetic determinism can be loosely
defined as the view that genes (genotypes) cause traits
(phenotypes) [28]. This definition is almost trivially true,
because most traits have some type of genetic basis. More
precisely, one could say that trait T is genetically deter-
mined if it is caused by gene G. For example, a person who
is born with two copies of the Sickle Cell allele will almost
certainly develop Sickle Cell Disease (SCD), provided that
some necessary environmental conditions obtain. SCD is
said to be genetically determined. However, even this def-
inition is not precise enough, since it ignores that fact that
genetic causation is usually not deterministic in the strict
sense: genes often merely increase the probability, though
sometimes quite substantially, that an organism will
develop a particular trait [29,28]. For example, BRCA1
and BRCA2 mutations increase a woman's lifetime prob-
ability of developing breast cancer from 36% to 85%,
compared to 13.2% for the general population [30]. Peo-
ple with the APOE4 mutation have an increased risk of
developing Alzheimer's disease, but most of them will not
develop this condition [31]. To differentiate between
these types of genetic causation, we distinguish between
three different forms of genetic determinism:
Strong genetic determinism: gene G almost always leads
to the development of trait T. (G increases the probability
of T and the probability of T, given G, is 95% or greater).
Moderate genetic determinism: more often than not G
leads to the development of T. (G increases the probabil-
ity of T and the probability of T, given G is greater than
50%).
Weak genetic determinism: G sometimes leads to the
development of T. (G increase the probability of T, but the
probability of T is still less than 50%.)Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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Geneticists have a term – "penetrance" – that is similar to
what we have in mind here. Penetrance is often defined as
the percentage of members of a population that will have
a particular phenotype, given a particular genotype [32].
Strong genetic determinism is not very common: the vast
majority of traits are either moderately or weakly deter-
mined by genetics [33,32]. There are several reasons why
strong genetic determinism turns out to be rare. First and
foremost, the environment plays a very important role in
the expression of most genes. An individual with the
genetic potential to be six feet tall will not reach this
height if he/she lacks a proper diet during childhood; an
individual with a genetic predisposition toward alcohol-
ism will not develop this disease if he/she never drinks
alcohol. The complex interaction and interdependence of
genes and environments, a fundamental and frequently
ignored reality of biology, undermines the notion that
genotypes alone determine (or cause) phenotypes
[34,35]. Second, most traits are epistatic: they are deter-
mined not by a single gene but by many different genes.
Dozens or even hundreds of genes may play a causal role
in the genesis of complex traits such as intelligence, per-
sonality, or athletic ability. So, a single gene may only
have a small influence on the development of the trait
[32]. Third, development (or epigenesis) has a significant
impact on gene expression, i.e. how organisms convert
genetic information into traits [36]. Because developmen-
tal patterns and processes influence gene expression, two
organisms with identical genomes and substantially simi-
lar environments may still express different phenotypes
[35]. Identical twins, for example, usually look very simi-
lar but may possess subtle variations in hair, skin pigmen-
tation, facial shape, fingerprints, or dental impressions.
Even among cloned animals there may also be phenotypic
differences [37].
Since most traits are not strongly genetically determined,
Nozick's genetic supermarket scenario strikes us as having
little grounding in reality. While parents may one day
select among genes that will increase or decrease the odds
that their children will develop specific traits, creating
children will not be like shopping for an automobile or
designing a home. Despite this reality, popular culture,
the media, and politicians are apt to ignore the fact that
strong genetic determinism is almost entirely a myth.
Journalists continue to speak of "genes for obesity,"
"genes for alcoholism," and "cancer genes," as if genes
exist that, once discovered, will give individuals the ability
to simply "shut off" obesity, alcoholism, or cancer with a
few simple snips to their genome.
The idea of a "genetic age" continues to exert a powerful
influence on popular culture and many individuals regard
genes as possessing nearly magical power, as well as moral
and religious significance [38]. As explained below, these
popularized and sensationalized imaginations of the
power of genotypes to control and determine phenotypes
have influenced, and indeed serve as the foundation for,
some of the most common contemporary arguments
employed against genetic modification.
Before concluding this section of our article, we briefly
discuss three other points, each of which call into ques-
tion the deterministic portrayal of genes and are, there-
fore, relevant to understanding the role of genetic
determinism in arguments against genetic modification.
First, advances in behavioral genetics – the study of the
genetic basis of behavior – suggest that genetic determin-
ism may have implications for psychological determinism
[39]. If an individual has a gene linked to a type of behav-
ior, such as aggression, does this gene undermine the indi-
vidual's free will when it comes to that behavior? Can an
individual with a genetic tendency toward aggression
choose to not act aggressively? If he/she has a gene that
predisposes him to aggression, should he/she be held
legally or morally responsible for his actions? Behavioral
genetics has led some legal scholars to raise questions like
these [39,40]. We will not enter the debate about the
implications of behavioral genetics for criminal justice.
However, we would like to note that those who are trou-
bled by these questions must assume two different kinds
of determinism to get their arguments off the ground:
strong genetic determinism and psychological determin-
ism. To seriously claim that a gene linked to aggression
invalidates the free will of a person with that gene, one
would need to show that the gene both strongly deter-
mines aggressive tendencies in people and, in addition,
that people with these tendencies are not free to act differ-
ently. Such a person would truly be a puppet controlled
by his/her genes [23].
Our second point distinguishes between determinism and
fatalism. Fatalism is the view that specific outcomes or
events will occur in our lives no matter what we do. The
classic example of fatalism is the myth of Oedipus. A
prophet told Oedipus that he would kill his father and
marry his mother. To avoid this horrible outcome, Oedi-
pus went to live far away from his homeland, and was still
unable to avoid fulfilling the prophecy. Analogously,
genetic fatalism is the view that we cannot avoid specific
genetically predetermined outcomes, no matter what we
do or what happens to us: our fate is in our genes. Accord-
ing to Lewontin[34], genetic fatalism also has social and
political implications, because it implies that much of
social and political realities are beyond our control.
Although genetic fatalism has also become a popular
belief in some circles, critical examination of this idea
shows that it does not square with modern biology, orPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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with commonsense. As an almost trivial example, for
genetic fatalism to be true an individual possessing a gene
responsible for a specific type of cancer must develop that
type of cancer, no matter what he or she does. Clearly, this
is not the way the world works. Leaving aside any discus-
sion of genetic causation and assuming that, in this case,
the gene strongly determines the phenotype (cancer), sci-
ence might yet discover a pre-emptive cure for that partic-
ular cancer and thus prevent phenotypic expression. Or,
to offer one macabre alternative, the person might get hit
by a bus and die before ever developing the cancer.
Our final point concerns the relationship between deter-
minism and control. As we show below, arguments
against genetic modification expound on moral problems
that can arise when one attempts to control human traits.
However, individual traits, just as events in the world,
may remain beyond human control despite being
strongly determined. For example, the collision of an
asteroid with the Earth is determined by the size, velocity,
and orbit of both celestial bodies, along with certain other
conditions. However, despite our knowledge of these fac-
tors, we will remain unable to prevent such a collision
unless and until human ingenuity and technology enable
the successful manipulation of these causal factors.
A similar situation is not hard to envision with respect to
human biology and genetics: a trait might be strongly
genetically determined but, nevertheless, remain beyond
our control as the result of either its complexity, including
its interactions with the environment, or our own lack of
scientific and technological ability. Suppose that intelli-
gence proves strongly genetically determined but that
there are over two hundred different separate genes
involved in the expression of this trait. The sheer complex-
ity necessarily entailed by hundreds of interrelated genes
might, in this hypothetical scenario, hinder and forever
frustrate our attempts to control or modify intelligence by
way of genetic manipulation. Moreover, since genes often
produce more than one phenotypic effect (a condition
known as pleiotropy), we may find it difficult to maxi-
mize intelligence without simultaneously causing adverse
affects, such as anxiety and aggression [41,42].
Arguments against genetic modification
Since the 1970s, scholars have developed a variety of argu-
ments against genetic modification of human beings. We
will not canvass all of these arguments here (for a review,
see Resnik, Steinkraus, and Langer [11]; Buchanan, Brock,
Daniels, and Wikler [10]; Mehlman [18]), but we will
divide them into two basic types: consequentialist and
non-consequentialist. Although critics of genetic modifi-
cation sometimes conflate consequentialist and non-con-
sequentialist concerns, we find it useful to clearly
distinguish between these two different forms of argu-
ment, since they are structured quite differently [43]. Con-
sider pornography as an example. The non-
consequentialist argument, that pornography is inher-
ently wrong, is logically different from the consequential-
ist argument that pornography is wrong because it
produces bad social consequences. The non-consequen-
tialist who believes that pornography is inherently wrong
is likely to favor a total ban on pornography, whereas the
consequentialist will be willing, at least in certain circum-
stances, to legalize and to regulate pornography.
Consequentialist arguments assert that the negative con-
sequences of genetic modification far outweigh any bene-
fits that may occur. These may include harms to children
and to future generations; loss of biological or cultural
diversity; economic costs; and the degradation of social
values such as acceptance of disabled people, respect for
the value of human life, and equality of opportunity.
Non-consequentialist arguments claim that there is some-
thing  inherently  wrong with genetic modification of
human beings: genetic modification would still be wrong
even if the good consequences of modification out-
weighed the bad. With this distinction clearly in mind we
turn now to examine four of the most influential non-
consequentialist arguments: the freedom argument, the
giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, and the
uniqueness argument.
1. Genetic modification and human freedom
The freedom argument claims that genetic modification
interferes with the ability of the modified human being to
make free choices. Hans Jonas[44,15] developed this
argument in the early 1970s as an objection to cloning.
Leon Kass[14,45], Dena Davis[46], and Francis Fuku-
yama[17] have developed and expanded different ver-
sions and interpretations of this argument. The freedom
argument can be understood in three different ways:
(a) Genetic modification prevents that person who has
been modified from making free choices related to the
modified trait. The modifier controls the person's future
by controlling his/her genes. If you have been given a gene
for musical talent, you have no choice but to become a
musician. We will call this the Puppet Critique.
(b) Genetic modification limits the options of the person
who is modified by limiting their range of behaviors and
life plans. A person with a gene that causes him/her to
grow to a height of seven feet cannot become a jockey. We
will call this the Open Future Critique.
(c) Genetic modification interferes with the person's abil-
ity to make free choices by increasing parental expecta-
tions and demands. A person with a gene for musicalPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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talent will face enormous pressure to become a musician.
We will call this the Parental Expectations Critique.
As we now show, all three of these critiques, covered by
the broader umbrella argument that genetic modification
interferes with the freedom of the modified individual,
rest heavily upon unsupportable assumptions of genetic
determinism.
a. The Puppet Critique
The Puppet Critique assumes strong forms of genetic and
psychological determinism. For this argument to work,
one must assume that the gene strongly determines the
development of a particular behavioral trait and that the
person will be unable to avoid expressing that trait. The
modified person with a gene for musical ability will have
no choice but to develop this ability to its fullest extent: he
or she will become a professional musician. Kass develops
this sort of argument in his critique of human cloning:
The child is given a genotype that has already lived, with
full expectation that this blueprint of a past life ought to
be controlling of the life that is to come. Cloning is inher-
ently despotic, for it seeks to make one's children (or
someone else's children) after one's own image (or an
image of one's choosing) and their future according to
one's will. In some cases, the despotism may be mild and
benevolent. In other cases, it will be mischievous and
downright tyrannical. But despotism – the control of
another through one's will – it inevitably will be [[45], at
pg 24].
This type of argument, the cloner as the despotic puppet-
master, is highly problematic because, as previously dis-
cussed, it relies on dubious biological and psychological
assumptions. First, contrary to Kass's implication, exerting
control over a child's genotype does not give one despotic
control to shape "their future according to one's will."
Both environmental and developmental factors must be
considered. A person with a gene for musical ability may
not develop this ability if he/she loses his/her hearing as a
result of childhood illness, is not exposed to music at an
appropriate time, or is not afforded the chance to play and
to practice an instrument. To seek the sort of despotism
that Kass has in mind – "to make one's own chil-
dren...after one's own image" – will require more than just
a reproductive decision; it will require a lifelong commit-
ment.
Even more problematic for the Puppet Critique is the
assumption of psychological determinism, as the individ-
ual might decide not to pursue a modified trait to its full-
est extent. The most genetically gifted musician might
nevertheless forgo a career as a musician or a composer,
favoring life as an accountant or attorney instead. Indeed,
the person might even come to share Kass' dismal opinion
of cloning, and rebel against what his/her parents
believed was a genetic gift for that or any number of more
benign reasons [47]. At its most basic level, the Puppet
Critique relies on misstatements of scientific reality, and
plays on the public's worst fears about the powers of
genetics [23].
b. The Open Future Critique
The Open Future Critique also assumes a strong form of
genetic determinism (although it does not assume psy-
chological determinism) in arguing that genetic modifica-
tion narrows the range of life choices available to a
modified individual. If life is conceived of as a journey
with many different possible roads that an individual
might travel then genetic modification, according to this
critique, may close off some of those roads. Dena
Davis[46] argues that one form of genetic modification
violates the child's right to an open future: deaf parents
deciding to conceive a child that will have a gene that will
make him or her deaf. According to Davis, such decisions
close off options for the child, such as the ability to partic-
ipate fully in hearing culture.
There are, we believe, conceptual difficulties with the right
to an open future critique: How can one compare different
possible futures? What makes one future more open than
another? Isn't it good to close off certain choices? We will
set these issues aside and assume that parents have an
obligation to avoid making decisions that are likely to
narrow the range of arguably desirable choices, or life
pathways, that their children might otherwise have avail-
able to them.
Even if we grant this contestable point, genetic modifica-
tion closes off the child's open future only if one assumes
a certain strong form of genetic determinism: that by
choosing a particular genotype one produces a child with
fewer options. Otherwise, in the absence of a strong causal
link between genotype and phenotype, genetic modifica-
tion might not close off any options for the child. Recall
that genes may not be expressed (consider, again, environ-
mental and developmental constraints, as well as the gen-
eral complexity of a given trait). Similarly, due to the
reasons outlined above, even if a desired trait is success-
fully expressed it may not actually restrict options for the
child. Of course, we do not deny that there are some geno-
type-phenotype relationships in which genes are strongly
determinative. And one can imagine certain scenarios –
such as intentionally modifying a child with a gene that is
strongly determinative for a serious disease or disability –
which would clearly violate the child's right to an open
future, and which would be objectionable for a host of
other reasons as well. But the open future critique paints
with a far broader brush, alleging that the act of modifica-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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tion per se impacts the child's right to an open future. And
it is this claim that we reject: there are different forms of
genetic modification and, correspondingly, they impact a
child's right to an open future in different ways. The claim
that genetic modification is inherently violative of a
child's right to an open future is one that ignores the var-
ying degrees of genetic determinism and it is, therefore,
one that we reject.
c. The Parental Expectations Critique
The Parental Expectations Critique assumes that parents
will burden their genetically modified children with
unreasonably high expectations and demands. To con-
tinue with our music example, a parent who seeks to have
a child with the genes of a musical prodigy will steer the
child toward a career in music and, in so doing, will inter-
fere with that child's decision-making.
[A]n enlarged degree of parental control over the genetic
endowments of their children cannot fail to alter the par-
ent-child relationship. Selecting against disease merely
relieves the parents of the fear of specific ailments afflict-
ing their child; selecting for desired traits inevitably plants
specific hopes and expectations as to how their child
might excel. More than any child does now, the "better"
child may bear the burden of living up to the standards he
was "designed" to meet. The oppressive weight of his par-
ents' expectations – resting in this case on what they
believe to be undeniable biological facts – may impinge
upon the child's freedom to make his own way in the
world [[6], at pg 55–56].
The image of overbearing parents, empowered and
emboldened by the tools of genetic modification, repre-
sents a well-worn critique repackaged using updated lan-
guage and terminology. To the extent that genetic
modification represents a means by which parents seek to
impose their expectations on their children it is no differ-
ent in kind from other assisted reproduction technologies
that have been in operation for decades. The parent who
seeks to give her child the "music gene" is hardly any dif-
ferent from the parent who seeks a world-class musician
to be a sperm or an egg donor, and the expectations placed
on the resulting child will not be fundamentally of a dif-
ferent kind simply because genetic modification was used
instead of in vitro fertilization. Indeed, some scholars sug-
gest that, paradoxically, parents who go to the trouble to
use assisted reproduction may be less likely to place high
demands on their children due to factors such as age and
emotional maturity [48].
To the extent that the Parental Expectations Critique
applies specifically to genetic modification it relies, not
surprisingly, on a misstated deterministic relationship
between genotype and phenotype. And as we have dis-
cussed at length, it is simply not the case that the ability to
specify genotype will present parents with the opportunity
to control phenotype, no matter how strongly they expect
to be able to do so. However, in an important respect the
Parental Expectations Critique relies merely on the belief
in, and not the reality of, strong genetic determinism. This
critique of genetic modification, unlike other freedom-
based critiques, need not make the demonstrably unsup-
portable assumption that strong determinism links most
genotype-phenotype pairs; it need only assume that par-
ents act under this belief and expect their children to
develop accordingly. Parents acting under this belief may
also take steps, wittingly or unwittingly, to control the
child's environment in the hope or the expectation that
the child will develop specific phenotypes [49].
While it is certainly possible that some parents who utilize
genetic modification will naïvely assume, implicitly or
explicitly, the presence of a strong genetic determinism,
this is a property that is inherent neither in the process of
genetic modification nor in the status of being a parent.
With adequate counselling and education most parents
may be steered away from this problematic assumption.
For instance, most fertility specialists aim to ensure that
prospective parents receive adequate information about
the nature of procedures used in assisted reproduction,
potential benefits, limitations, potential risks, and costs.
Informed consent is one of the important ethical pillars of
reproductive medicine [50]. Appropriate education and
counseling should similarly inform parents of the limited
ability of genetic modification to control the traits of an
offspring. Patients usually understand that a suggested
course of treatment does not come with a guarantee of
success. And prospective parents recognize that a pro-
posed infertility treatment does not guarantee a preg-
nancy. With appropriate education and counselling
parents will come to similarly understand that genetic
modification cannot guarantee a musical genius, a star
athlete, or a child that is forever free from cancer. They will
learn that except in rare cases, genetic modifications deals
in the realm of probability, of increased or decreased like-
lihoods, and not with the definite causation of specific
phenotypic traits.
Thus, to the extent that the this critique is grounded in the
fear of increased parental expectations due to a height-
ened or expanded ability to exert control over the pheno-
typic development of children, it succumbs to the same
genetic determinism counter-arguments that we have
raised repeatedly. And to the extent that it depends on the
perception of genetic determinism it does not support the
conclusion that genetic enhancement technologies are
inherently problematic and must be banned; only that
our understanding of them is imperfect. Either way, the
solution is not to reject genetic modification entirely.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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Rather, it is to continue to work to treat genetic modifica-
tion seriously, to evaluate the medical, social, economic,
political, and biological consequences of specific technol-
ogies, and to promote a more accurate and widespread
understanding of what genetic modification actually
entails, and what it can and cannot accomplish.
2. Genetic modification and giftedness
We group together a number of similar concerns under
the "giftedness" objection to genetic modification. The
basic theme that unites these different concerns is that
genetic modification treats children as products to be
designed, perfected, manipulated, and controlled. Chil-
dren are no longer viewed as gifts, but as commodities.
Jonas[15]and Kass[14] have voiced the concern that vari-
ous forms of assisted reproduction can have a detrimental
affect on how parents view their children. More recently,
Michael Sandel has developed the argument that genetic
modification is problematic because it represents
...a kind of hyperagency – a Promethean aspiration to
remake nature, including human nature, to serve our pur-
poses and satisfy our desires. The problem is not the drift
to mechanism but the drive to mastery. And what the
drive to mastery misses and may even destroy is an appre-
ciation of the gifted character of human powers and
achievements...The problem is not that parents usurp the
autonomy of a child they design. The problem lies in the
hubris of the designing parents, in their drive to master
the mystery of birth [[16] at pg 54, 56].
The problem with genetic enhancement, according to this
argument, is that it gives parents too much control over
the traits of their children. In another common articula-
tion of this critique, parents and others supporting genetic
modification are accused of desiring to "play God", and of
designing children to fulfill their own desires.
This argument straightforwardly assumes a strong version
of genetic determinism: genetics can be used to control
traits only if those traits are strongly determined by genet-
ics in the first instance. But with the knowledge that most
traits are not strongly determined by genetics the vision of
hordes of parents shaping their children and, in the proc-
ess, remaking nature loses its cogency. Parents may be
able to influence nature but they are surely unable to mas-
ter it. Even if there is, as Sandel suggests, a "drive to mas-
tery," a wide array of limitations – the inherently limited
causal relationship between genes and traits, a lack of
actual scientific or technological mastery, etc. – strongly
suggest that our ability to exert control via genetic modifi-
cation will necessarily fall far short of anything that could
be construed as mastery. That genetic modification
encourages a "drive to mastery" is not nearly as worrisome
once we understand that it is a drive that must inevitably
fall far short of anything resembling actual mastery.
Once one sees through the strong deterministic assump-
tions that buttress the giftedness argument it loses its per-
suasive power. And once parents realize that they cannot
substantially control the genetic composition of their chil-
dren, or the traits those children will express, they are
likely to regard their children just as they have tradition-
ally regarded them, as gifts to be accepted rather than as
products to be perfected.
3. Genetic modification and authenticity
The third critique we will consider is the claim that genetic
modification undermines the authenticity of a person's
accomplishments. The basic idea here is that the geneti-
cally modified individual's talents and abilities are no
longer his own, that they are the product of the modifica-
tion. Following this argument leads to the conclusion, for
example, that a person with genetically-enhanced musical
genius is not really a musical genius after all: he or she is
a fake. According to the President's Council on Bioethics:
[T]he naturalness of means matters. It lies not in the fact
that the assisting drugs or devices are artifacts, but in the
danger of violating or deforming the nature of human
agency...In most of our ordinary efforts at self-improve-
ment...we sense the relation between our doings and the
resulting improvement, between the means used and the
ends sought...In contrast, biotechnical interventions act
directly on the human body and mind to bring about their
effects on a passive subject [[6] at pg 292].
We set to one side the question of whether this concern
about authenticity is appropriately directed at genetic
modification, especially when we consider all of the other
various biotechnical interventions that directly impact
individuals' bodies and minds, and note only that this
argument also assumes a strong form of genetic determin-
ism. The authenticity argument claims that the person
who benefits from a genetic modification plays no signif-
icant role in the development of the desired trait. For that
to be the case, a person with a gene for musical ability
must remain merely a passive subject in the development
of his or her musical aptitude, doing nothing important to
realize or to improve that ability.
This is strong determinist assumption indeed. Although a
genetically modified person may be a passive subject in
the development of certain traits, such as eye color or skin
color, he or she must take an active role in the develop-
ment of most traits in which authenticity might be any
concern, such as intelligence, athletic ability, social skills,
or musical ability. Although genetic modification may
confer an advantage in developing or maximizing a partic-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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ular trait, the genetically modified individual cannot rely
on genes alone. To continue with our now well-worn
example of musical ability, even a person born with the
ideal genotype must still invest considerable time and
effort in the practice, performance, and perfection of his
or her craft in order to develop into a world-class musi-
cian.
As a final note, it clearly makes no difference whether that
person's genetic gift results from random assortment of
genes during natural human reproduction or from an arti-
ficial process, such as genetic modification. In either case
the person will be an active agent and not a passive sub-
ject. We don't complain too heartily about the authentic-
ity of elite (and "unmodified") athletes, musicians, or
intellectuals because we recognize that their achievements
are not solely the result of their favorable genetic profile.
Why, then, should we suddenly change our tune when an
individual's genes are determined by conscious choice
rather than by the "genetic lottery." Just as before genes
will represent only one of the causal elements, and often
a comparatively trivial one, in the individual's ultimate
phenotypic expression. In the absence of strongly deter-
mining genes there is no reason why the achievements of
the genetically modified individual should not be consid-
ered fully authentic.
4. Genetic modification and uniqueness
This fourth and final argument postulates that a particular
form of genetic modification, cloning, violates the
uniqueness of the cloned person. The President's Council
on Bioethics argues that cloning would inherently inter-
fere with the individuality of the cloned person and there-
fore undermine the formation of his or her personal
identity:
Cloning-to-produce-children could create serious prob-
lems of identity and individuality...Personal identity is,
we would emphasize, a complex and subtle psychological
phenomenon, shaped ultimately by the interaction of
many diverse factors. But it does seem reasonably clear
that cloning would at the very least present a unique and
possibly disabling challenge to the formation of individ-
ual identity...our genetic uniqueness is an important
source of our sense of who we are and how we regard our-
selves. It is an emblem of independence and individuality.
It endows us with a sense of life as a never-before-enacted
possibility [[5] at pg 102–103].
In advancing this argument from uniqueness the Presi-
dent's Council makes two key mistakes.
The scientific mistake is the familiar assumption of strong
genetic determinism, with the unsupportable conclusion
that two individuals with identical genomes will exhibit
identical phenotypic expression. Not so. On the basis of
the significant physical and behavioral differences found
between identical twins[51], as well as for the multitude
of reasons discussed above, it seems a near certainty that
even genetically identical clones would exhibit very differ-
ent traits.
The corresponding philosophical mistake made by the
President's Council is to assume that genetic composition
bears any significant relationship to a person's own self-
identity. Arguably, genetic uniqueness matters very little
to most people. Most people develop their sense of self
from their life experiences, relationships, values, character
traits, interests, and skills [51]. Again, the identical twin
case is helpful here: identical twins typically have no diffi-
culty viewing themselves as distinct individuals, despite
their genetic similarity. Unless an individual were atypi-
cally fixated on genetic characteristics a genetically modi-
fied individual, even a genetic clone, would be unlikely to
use genetic uniqueness to measure his or her sense of self
(see Ishiguro, 2005, for a fictional but illuminating exam-
ple of how individuality may thrive despite a lack of
genetic uniqueness) [52]. Stripping away determinist
assumptions makes clear once again that genetic modifi-
cation, even reproductive cloning, is highly unlikely to
deprive human beings of uniqueness or personal identity.
Conclusion
In this article we have argued that four of the most well-
worn objections to genetic modification of human beings
– the freedom argument, the giftedness argument, the
authenticity argument, and the uniqueness argument –
rely heavily on deterministic assumptions. These argu-
ments assume that, despite conclusive evidence to the
contrary, most traits are strongly determined by genetics
(or that individuals believe, and act as if, this is the case).
These deterministic assumptions are demonstrably false.
Utilizing such false assumptions to support an argument
that genetic modification is inherently objectionable
exploits the public's worst fears and perpetuates misun-
derstandings concerning basic human biology and genet-
ics.
So far, most of the debates about the ethics of genetic
modification have stayed largely within the confines of
academia and have not had a major or lasting impact on
public policy. But the day is coming – we think sooner
rather than later – when political leaders will be com-
pelled to make difficult choices concerning genetic modi-
fication. Thus, the need for well reasoned scientific policy
is increasingly a pressing one. Such policy cannot be built
on logical or biological errors and misunderstandings: it
should rest on a clear and accurate understanding of the
best scientific evidence available. As we have seen, the
four critiques of genetic modification examined in thisPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/9
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paper are frequently used to portray genetic modification
as inherently objectionable and immoral, and they are fre-
quently accompanied by the policy suggestion of a ban on
further scientific research and development.
Having demonstrated that these non-consequentialist
arguments rely on faulty determinist assumptions, we sug-
gest that the public and scientific policy debate should
concern itself instead with alternative arguments that
address concerns about risk, safety, social and economic
consequences, and justice. These alternative, consequen-
talist arguments tend to support the view that genetic
modification is not inherently immoral but that the
morality of genetic modification depends on its imple-
mentation and its use by individuals and society, and on
the consequences produced therein. While predicting the
consequences of genetic modification is a speculative
exercise we conclude that it is this approach, one free from
foundational misconceptions about the deterministic role
of genetics in individual development, that is considera-
bly more likely to bear fruit in developing the effective
and sustainable science policies that will be so urgently
required in the years to come.
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